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STRETCHING LIABILITY Too FAR: COLORADO'S FELONY
MURDER STATUTE IN LIGHT OF A UMAN
INTRODUCTION
Felony murder is a widely debated theory of accomplice liability.'
Generally, felony murder liability is triggered if a death results during the
commission of a specifically enumerated felony.2 Some jurisdictions
have expanded the scope of liability to include the immediate flight from
the felony.3 Most recently the Colorado Supreme Court has stated that
even arrest does not automatically terminate the immediate flight stage of
felony murder as a matter of law, and even worse, a co-felon can still be
held liable for a death occurring after her own arrest.
4
In Auman v. People5 the Colorado Supreme Court stretched Colo-
rado's felony murder statute beyond a reasonable scope. Auman was the
first person in the state of Colorado to be convicted of murder while in
official police custody.6 The Colorado Supreme Court dodged the issue
of immediate flight in this case and remanded it on a technicality. The
court refused to define the limitations of immediate flight, and stated that
arrest, as a matter of law, does not cut off liability for felony murder.8
The felony murder rule should not be extended beyond the purpose
it was designed to serve, namely, to deter felons from causing a homicide
during the commission of the crime. Holding Auman liable for the death
of Officer VanderJagt was not a rational function that the felony murder
doctrine was designed to serve. 9 The Auman case sparked national con-
troversy over the degree of culpability an individual should have while in
police custody.'0 The mass amount of public outcry after the trial illus-
trates how the Colorado Supreme Court has gone too far.
This Comment criticizes the Colorado Supreme Court's ruling on
the issue of arrest not terminating immediate flight as a matter of law.
1. Lindsay Fortado, A Tale of Murder, and Who Pays the Price Case Triggers Debate Over
Felony Murder Rule, NAT'L L. J., June 21,2004, col. 1, at 6.
2. See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 515 (3d ed. 2001)
("Under most modem murder statutes, a death that results from the commission of an enumerated
felony (usually a dangerous felony, such as arson, rape, robbery, or burglary) constitutes first-degree
murder for which the maximum penalty is death or life imprisonment."); See also COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-3-102 (2004).
3. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102 (2005); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (Consol. 2005).
4. Auman v. People, 109 P.3d 647, 650 (Colo. 2005).
5. 109 P.3d 647 (Colo. 2005).
6. Auman, 109 P.3d at 650; Diane Carman, Auman Case Hangs from a Split Hair, DENVER
POST, Sept. 14, 2004, at BO.
7. Auman, 109 P.3d at 650.
8. Id
9. See generally DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 516 (explaining that the deterrence rationale
does not, in fact, deter accidental killings during felonies).
10. Fortado, supra note 1, at 6.
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The shooting of Officer VanderJagt was outside the scope of immediate
flight, and an already in custody Auman should not have paid the price
for the shooter's actions." Part I addresses the facts that led the court to
its holding in Auman. Part II addresses the majority opinion and Chief
Justice Mullarkey's dissent. Part III summarizes the issues of causation
and the justifications for felony murder statutes in general. Part IV ex-
amines felony murder liability from other jurisdictions across the United
States, highlighting the trend to either eliminate or limit the scope of
liability. Part V describes the current Colorado felony murder statute and
traces the emergence of immediate flight. Part VI criticizes the court's
ruling as an overly broad interpretation of Colorado's felony murder
statute. This Part also offers a possible limitation to felony murder liabil-
ity in specific instances.
I. FACTS OF AUMAN V. PEOPLE'
2
On November 12, 1997, Lisl Auman and four others broke the pad-
lock on Auman's ex-boyfriend's apartment door and entered without his
permission.' 3 The group consisted of Auman's friend Demetria Soriano,
Soriano's boyfriend Dion Gerze, and Gerze's friends: Mattaeus Jaehnig
and Stephen Duprey.14 Auman asked the group to assist her in gathering
her belongings from Shawn Cheever's apartment. 15  The group took
Auman's items and some of Cheever's personal property, loading them
into two cars. 16 Auman then proceeded from Cheever's apartment with
Jaehnig in a stolen Trans-Am. 17  The police pursued them into what
turned into a high-speed chase. 18 At one point during the chase, Auman
held the steering wheel, while Jaehnig fired a weapon at an officer's
car.' 9  Auman and Jaehnig eventually stopped at Jaehnig's apartment
complex, and the two of them ran into an alcove.20
After hiding in the alcove for an extended period of time, Auman
turned herself over to the police and was placed in the back of a police
car.21 While Auman was in police custody, the officers questioned her
about Jaehnig's whereabouts and whether he was armed.22 She did not
11. Auman, 109 P.3d at 650.
12. 109 P.3d 647 (Colo. 2005).






19. Id. at 653. Lisl Auman has stated, "I surrendered as soon as I could. I did not think I
could have done anything to Mattaeus Jaehnig that could have changed the warpath he was on. He
was in another world." Jeff Kass, I Feel for Her, and I Feel for Her Little Girl, ROCKY MTN. NEWS,
Mar. 18, 2001, at 38A (interview with Lisl Auman, in Canon City Women's Prison).
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answer the questioning.23 She had been in police custody for approxi-
mately five minutes when Officer VanderJagt, while continuing his
search for Jaehnig, looked around a comer and was fatally shot by
Jaehnig.24 Jaehnig then shot and killed himself with the officer's gun.
25
Jaehnig was high on methamphetamines at the time of the crimes.26
Moreover, he had a lengthy rap sheet consisting of an array of violent
crimes and was a dedicated white supremacist.
27
Although Auman was in police custody at the time of the shooting,
the jury convicted her of second-degree burglary and first-degree felony
murder.28 She received a life sentence for the death of Officer Vander-
Jagt.29 Auman appealed her conviction to the Colorado Court of Appeals
raising the issue that arrest, as a matter of law, terminates the immediate
flight stage for felony murder.30 The Court of Appeals affirmed both the
convictions of burglary and felony murder.3' Auman then appealed to the
Colorado Supreme Court.32 The Colorado Supreme Court initially
granted certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals properly
concluded that arrest does not terminate liability for felony murder as a
matter of law. 33 However, after initial briefing and arguments, the Colo-
rado Supreme Court asked for additional materials, including supplemen-
tal briefs and arguments, on the issue of whether the Court of Appeals
had properly instructed the jury on the elements of felony murder.34
II. A UMAN V. PEOPLE35
The Colorado Supreme Court held that when a co-felon is arrested,
that action alone does not automatically terminate liability for felony
murder as a matter of law.36 Moreover, liability is not cut off for the
arrested co-felon when a co-participant, still in flight from the predicate
felony, commits a murder.37 The court stated that arrest, in other circum-
23. Id. There is some dispute about what exactly Auman said after being placed in police
custody. See Lisl.com, http://www.lisl.com/facts.htm (listing disputed facts).
24. Auman, 109 P.3d at 653.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 654.
27. See Lisl.com, Matthaeus Reinhart Jaehring Rap Sheet, http://www.lisl.com/jaehrap.htm
(last visited Nov. 6, 2005).
28. Auman, 109 P.3d at 654-55.
29. Id. The prosecution decided not to charge the others involved with felony murder. All
five accomplices went to the apartment that day. Only Auman was charged with felony murder.
The District Attorney reviewed filing felony murder charges against the others, but did not file since
he believed the prosecution would not meet the burden of proof on all the elements. Soriano, Gerze,
and Duprey pled guilty to burglary. Duprey received four years in prison. Gerze and Soriano both
received two years probation. Jeff Kass, Cop Killing Case Brought Wide Range of Penalties; State's
High Court Eyes Controversial Auman Sentence, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Jan. 15, 2004, at 33A.
30. Auman, 109 P.3d at 654.
31. People v. Auman, 67 P.3d 741 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002), rev"d, 109 P.3d 647 (Colo. 2005).
32. Auman, 109 P.3d at 647.
33. Id. at 655.
34. Id.
35. 109 P.3d 647 (Colo. 2005).
36. Auman, 109 P.3d at 650.
37. ld
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stances, might terminate liability, but strictly as a matter of law, it does
not.38 Auman, who had been in police custody for five minutes at the
time her co-participant shot and killed a police officer, was sentenced to
life in prison for the death of the officer.39 Auman is no longer serving a
life sentence in prison because the Colorado Supreme Court reversed her
conviction on a faulty jury instruction for burglary.40 However, the
Colorado Supreme Court decision was not unanimous.4' Chief Justice
Mullarkey agreed with the majority's opinion up to the point where they
determined that the erroneous jury instruction rose to the level of re-
versible error.4 2 Chief Justice Mullarkey would not have reversed
Auman's conviction.43
A. Majority Opinion
In addressing Auman's arrest, the court determined that arrest does
not automatically terminate immediate flight for purposes of felony mur-
der liability when another participant is still in flight from the crime.
44
The court then concluded that the issue of whether a co-felon is still in
the stages of immediate flight is a question for the jury.45 The court fur-
ther stated that the concept of immediate flight is "broad" and, that as a
matter of law, "felony murder does not terminate where death occurs
during continuous flight from the predicate felony, nor does it terminate
where intervening events interrupt flight."'46  The Colorado Supreme
Court did not find that arrest terminates liability as a matter of law be-
cause they did not want to take that issue away from the jury. The issue
of whether arrest terminates immediate flight is not included in the fel-
ony murder statute; therefore, the jury must look at the unique facts of
every case to make that determination.47
The jury must decide whether: (1) there is a "temporal connection
between the predicate felony, flight and death" thereby making it "im-
mediate" and (2) whether the death occurring after a defendant's arrest is
still "in the course of or in furtherance of immediate flight."" The jury
instruction submitted told the jury that they could find Auman liable for
felony murder, if they found "beyond a reasonable doubt that Officer
38. Id. at 656. The court mentioned two instances where arrest might terminate liability: (1)
when the defendant was acting alone and is subsequently placed under arrest; (2) when all co-
participants of the underlying crime have been arrested. Id.
39. Id. at 653.
40. Id. at 671. After the Supreme Court remanded the case Auman accepted a plea bargain,
pled guilty to burglary and accessory to first-degree murder, and was sentenced to 20 years in a
community corrections facility. Jim Kirksey, Auman Bid Gets Widow Backing, DENVER POST, Aug.
17, 2005, at B-01.
41. Auman, 109 P.3d at 671-76 (Mullarkey, C.J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 671.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 650.
45. Id. at 659.
46. Id. at 657.
47. Id. at 659.
48. Id.
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VanderJagt's death was caused by anyone 'in the course of or in the fur-
therance of burglary, or in the immediate flight therefrom."'' 49 Auman
argued that this instruction was erroneous since it did not require the jury
to find both a temporal and a causal connection between the immediate
flight and the death.50 The court agreed that the instruction was worded
incorrectly but concluded that it was not a reversible error.5
Auman submitted a supplemental instruction for the jury that de-
fined the limitations of immediate flight, but the trial court refused to
submit it to the jury.52 This instruction stated that immediate flight
means that:
no intervening event has broken the continuity of the underlying
crime; a person is not in the immediate fight from a burglary if an en-
tirely new episode of events has begun; nor is a person in immediate
flight if she has reached a point of temporary safety or is subject to
complete custody at the time the death is caused.
53
For a defendant to be allowed an intervening cause instruction there
has to be three conditions that are met: (1) "a defendant must introduce
competent evidence to show that the ultimate harm would not have oc-
curred in the absence of the claimed intervening cause;" (2) "a claimed
intervening cause must be one that the defendant could not foresee;" and
(3) "such a cause must be one in which the defendant does not partici-
pate., 54 Auman argued that Jaehnig was running from the police because
the car was stolen and he was high on methamphetamines. 55 The court
concluded that since Auman produced no evidence to demonstrate that
Jaehnig's actions were an intervening cause, she was not entitled to the
instruction.56
In addressing Auman's affirmative defense to felony murder, the
court turned to the elements in the Colorado felony murder statute that
require that the defendant "not only had nothing to do with the killing
itself, but was unarmed and had no reason to believe that any of his con-
federates were armed or intended to engage in any conduct dangerous to
life.",57 Moreover, if the defendant believes that a co-felon might be
armed or might commit an act that would be dangerous, the defendant
may relieve herself of liability if she were to immediately disengage her-
self from the felony or the flight therefrom. 58 The court concluded that
Auman did not meet the requirements for the affirmative defense since
49. Id. at 660.
50. Id.
51. Id.




56. Id. at 662-63.
57. Id. at 657.
58. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(2) (2005).
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she had knowledge that her co-participant was armed and dangerous, and
she did nothing to disengage herself from the flight.59 However, Auman
did voluntarily relinquish herself over to police custody thereby, argua-
bly, "disengaging" herself from the underlying felony.60 The affirmative
defense does not require a co-participant to warn policemen of other
dangers.6' It only requires that she disengage herself from the flight if
there are reasonable grounds for her to believe that a co-participant might
engage in actions that could lead to a death or serious injury.62 If Auman
had warned police of Jaehnig's whereabouts, she might have qualified
for the affirmative defense. 63 Waving her Fifth Amendment right to si-
lence in order to aid the police officers would have helped Auman's de-
fense;64 however, Auman had an absolute right not to say a word.65 Nev-
ertheless, the court determined that since she did not speak to police
upon arrest, she did not qualify for the affirmative defense instruction.66
The jury convicted Auman of second degree burglary, which was
then used as the predicate crime for felony murder.67 The court consid-
ered whether the erroneous jury instruction on the predicate crime of
burglary constituted plain error thereby necessitating reversal of the de-
fendant's conviction.68 Burglary is a specific intent crime that required
Auman to knowingly break into the dwelling with the intent to commit a
crime inside. 69 However, on appeal Auman claimed that the jury instruc-
tion omitted an essential element of the crime of theft. 70 The instruction
submitted did not include the mental state of "knowingly" with the ele-
ment "without authorization" in the elements of burglary. 71 Auman pled
guilty to the charge of criminal trespassing, but insisted that she did not
plan to steal Cheever's property upon initial entry into the room, thereby
not committing a burglary.72 Because of the faulty instruction, the jury
could have convicted Auman of burglary without having to conclude that
59. Auman, 109 P.3d at 657.




63. § 18-3-102(2); Auman, 109 P.3d at 654.
64. See Auman, 109 P.3d at 654.
65. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Judge John Webb wisely noted this issue and asked that if "[t]he
officer was already dead, as was Jaehnig, so what difference did it make . .. what she said to the
police officers?" Karen Abbott, Judges Ask ifAuman Still Fleeing When Cop Was Shot; Question
Critical in Appeal of Murder Conviction in Death of Officer Shot by Her Accomplice, ROCKY MTN.
NEWS, May 1, 2002, at 5A (quoting a question asked by Judge John Webb during oral arguments
before the Colorado Court of Appeals in People v. Auman, 67 P.3d 741 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002)).
66. Auman, 109 P.3d at 654.
67. Jd. at 663 n.18.
68. Id. at 660.
69. Id. at 664. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-203(1) (2005) ("A person commits second de-
gree burglary, if the person knowingly breaks an entrance into, enters unlawfully in, or remains
unlawfully after a lawful or unlawful entry in a building or occupied structure with intent to commit
therein a crime against another person or property.").
70. Auman, 109 P.3d at 663-64; COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-401 (2005) (elements of theft).
71. Auman, 109 P.3d at 663-64.
72. Id.
[Vol. 83:2
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she intended to commit theft upon unlawfully entering Cheever's resi-
dence.73
Auman did not object to this instruction at trial, thereby not preserv-
ing the objection for appeal.74 The court reviewed for plain error,75 look-
ing at whether the omission of the word "knowingly" affected a substan-
tial right that damaged the fairness of Auman's trial.76 The court relied
on a prior opinion concluding that a similar jury instruction was reversi-
ble error since the instruction "allowed a guilty verdict to be returned
without a determination that [the] defendant was aware of his lack of
authority. 77  The court also weighed the amount of evidence against
Auman. 78 If there was an overwhelming amount of evidence of her guilt,
the evidence against her would have cured the instructional error.79
However, because the issue of Auman's intent was contested at trial,
there was not overwhelming evidence against her sufficient to cure the
error.80 Because the instruction omitted an essential element of the crime
of burglary, the Colorado Supreme Court determined that Auman was
deprived of a "full and fair jury consideration" of her defense. 81 There-
fore, the court reversed the conviction based on this instructional error,
since it was reasonable that a jury could have been misled by the instruc-
tion and convicted her without regard to her intent upon entering.
To summarize, the majority opinion held, as a matter of law, that ar-
rest does not automatically terminate immediate flight when another co-
felon is still in the stage of immediate flight.83 The court did not reverse
on the arrest issue; instead, it dodged the issue by reversing only on the
burglary instruction.84
B. Chief Justice Mullarkey's Dissent
Chief Justice Mullarkey disagreed with the majority opinion be-
cause Auman did not object to the jury instruction on burglary at trial,
thereby not preserving the objection for review on appeal. 85 Chief Jus-
tice Mullarkey agreed that the erroneous instruction could only be re-
viewed if it affected substantial rights and was considered plain error.86
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit adopted the following defi-
nition of plain error: "plain error is 'fundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so lack-
ing in its elements that justice cannot have been done' United States v. Coppola, 486 F.2d 882, 884
(10th Cir. 1973) (quoting United States v. Summerour, 279 F. Supp. 407,410 (E.D.Mich. 1968)).
76. Auman, 109 P.3d at 665.
77. Id. at 664 (citing People v. Bomman, 953 P.2d 952 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997)).
78. Id. at 669.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 650.
82. Id. at 671.
83. ld. at 651.
84. Id. at 671.
85. Id. (Mullarkey, C.J., dissenting).
86. Id.
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However, Chief Justice Mullarkey argued that the erroneous jury instruc-
tion on the predicate crime of burglary did not rise to the level of plain
error, and therefore the conviction should have been upheld.87
Chief Justice Mullarkey stated that all the instructions must be
looked at as a whole, not as separate entities. 88 In doing so, the Chief
Justice did not agree that the erroneous instruction had a direct effect on
the outcome of the case. 89 In her opinion, the phrase "by deception" in-
cluded in the instruction implied that the defendant acted "knowingly."
90
In view of the fact that the phrase included "by deception," there was, in
effect, no error in the instruction. 91 She further contended that it was a
possibility that the burglary instruction could have misled a juror, but
that the error did not contribute to the burglary conviction.92 Looking at
all the evidence as a whole in light of the instructions and the verdicts,
Chief Justice Mullarkey believed that the jury understood the elements of
each instruction, and therefore, rejected Auman's defense when it con-
victed her of second-degree burglary.
93
III. HISTORY
The history of felony murder is quite convoluted. Some scholars
declare that the United States inherited the doctrine from the common
law in England,94 while others believe it was created by our own system
of statutes and judicial interpretation. 95  Overall, "[t]he existence and
scope of the felony-murder doctrine have perplexed generations of law
students, commentators and jurists in the United States and England...
,,96 Regardless of whether the United States inherited this doctrine, or
created it within the judicial and legislative processes, felony murder is a
troubling doctrine. 97 On its face, felony murder is a theory of accomplice
liability that operates as a way to punish those individuals who partici-
pate in enumerated crimes that involve inherent danger and risk of
death.98 These felonies include "arson, robbery, burglary, kidnapping,
certain forms of sexual assault and sexual assault on a child, and the
crime of escape." 99 Felony murder holds individuals liable for commit-
ting felonies that result in a death. In Colorado, deaths occurring during
either the commission of the predicate felony or during the immediate
87. Id.






94. See Fortado, supra note 1, at 6 (contending that the felony murder rule was not inherited
from England).
95. Id.
96. People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 306 (Mich. 1980).
97. See James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony-Murder Rule: A Study of the
Forces that Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1442-48 (1994).
98. DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 515.
99. Id.; see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(1)(b) (2005).
[Vol. 83:2
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flight trigger liability under the felony murder doctrine.' 00 Liability will
attach even if the defendant did not possess the intent to kill and even if
the defendant did not do the actual killing. 01 The theory of felony mur-
der is based on transferred intent between crimes. 102 Therefore the intent
to kill "is imputed from the participant's intent to commit the predicate
felony."' 1 3 The theory of transferred intent, as used in the felony murder
doctrine, allows for the judicial system to manipulate the boundaries and
limitations of the rule.
A. Felony Murder Causation
One of the primary arguments against the felony murder rule in
general is that it ignores proximate cause, 10 4 thereby making one "re-
sponsible for consequences that are unforeseen or unlikely in the ex-
treme."'' 0 5 Early versions of the felony murder doctrine were in tune with
the requirements of proximate cause. 1° 6 As the doctrine developed over
time, the original rationale of the death being within the foreseeable
scope of the felony, has been slowly evaporating.10 7 Moreover, case law,
such as Auman, stretches the doctrine beyond the reasonable foreseeabil-
ity that the proximate cause element demands.1
0 8
The theory of proximate cause in felony murder cases has been jus-
tified simply as "when a felon's attempt to commit a forcible felony sets
in motion a chain of events which were or should have been within his
contemplation when the motion was initiated, he should be held respon-
sible for any death which by direct and almost inevitable sequence re-
sults from the initial criminal act."'1 9 This premise is sound: the law
should hold individuals responsible for their own actions and the fore-
100. Id.
101. Auman v. People, 109 P.3d 647, 655 (Colo. 2005).
102. Id.
103. Id. (citing Whitman v. People, 420 P.2d 416,418 (Colo. 1966)).
104. Rudolph J. Gerber, The Felony Murder Rule: Conundrum Without Principle, 31 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 763, 774-75 (1999) ("The felony murder doctrine is simply indifferent to these principles of
causation.").
105. Jeff Kass, Lawyers Debate Centuries-Old Legal Concept, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, March 18,
2001, at 38A (quoting William Pizzi, University of Colorado Law Professor).
106. See generally, DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 522-26 (discussing different approaches to
felony murder causation).
107. See Gerber, supra note 104, at 774 ("The felony murder doctrine is simply indifferent to
these principles of causation"); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1105(A)(2) (LexisNexis 2005)
Arizona expanded felony murder to include more than the standard inherently dangerous felonies.
See id. The statute states that it is first-degree murder if one is "[a]cting either alone or with one or
more other persons the person commits or attempts to commit sexual conduct with a minor...
sexual assault ... molestation of a child ... terrorism ... marijuana offenses ... dangerous drug
offenses ... narcotics offenses ... kidnapping ... burglary ... arson ... robbery ... escape ...
child abuse... unlawful flight from a pursuing law enforcement vehicle... and in the course of and
in furtherance of the offense or immediate flight from the offense, the person or another person
causes the death of any person." Id.
108. DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 525; see also Lynne H. Rambo, An Unconstitutional Fiction:
The Felony-Murder Rule as Applied to the Supply of Drugs, 20 GA. L. REV. 671, 691-92 (1986)
(discussing expansion of felony murder to suppliers of drugs as ignoring proximate causation).
109. People v. Lowery, 687 N.E.2d 973, 976 (111. 1997).
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DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
seeable results.l° Some attorneys believe that the statute is well within a
reasonable scope of liability and that "you are guilty for the logical con-
sequences of your actions.""' However, modem statutes, like Colo-
rado's, 1 2 have taken this theory and stretched it too far. Felony murder
historically only applied to the commission of the felony and any deaths
that occurred therein. 13 Furthermore, a causal connection between the
underlying felony and the death must be proved. 1 4 Now, juries in Colo-
rado may hold defendants responsible for actions that were committed by
another after the defendant was physically incapable of preventing the
death from occurring because they were in police custody.
115
Holding a felon responsible for actions of another co-felon commit-
ted after she is in custody is arguably beyond the scope of proximate
cause. 116 The basic theory of proximate cause in the field of criminal law
was simply stated as the "natural and probable consequences of [the de-
fendant's] acts." ' 1 7 Furthermore, the death cannot have been a "result of
an independent intervening cause in which the accused does not partici-
pate, and which he could not foresee." ' 1 8 It was not foreseeable, and
therefore not a proximate cause, that when Lisl Auman went to her ex-
boyfriend's home to retrieve her belongings that Officer VanderJagt
would be killed. The Colorado Supreme Court refused to reverse the
trial courts ruling disallowing the jury to take into consideration interven-
ing causes that cut off the chain of causation." 9 Arrest, logically, should
cut the chain of events for purposes of felony murder liability. 20 This
ruling stretched the felony murder doctrine beyond its original rationale
of foreseeability.121
B. Justifications for Felony Murder Rule
The felony murder rule, since its first codified appearance, 122 has
transformed into a doctrine that, in some instances, lacks justification and
purpose. The Model Penal Code attempted to eliminate felony murder
liability. 23  However, this model was not widely adopted and many
110. Hamrick v. People, 624 P.2d 1320, 1324 (Colo. 1981) (stating that people should be held
responsible for the natural and probable consequences of their acts).
111. Fortado, supra note 1, at 6.
112. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(l)(b).
113. Guyora Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57 STAN. L. REv. 59,
199-207 (2004); see also DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 515.
114. DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 523.
115. Auman, 109 P.3d at 650.
116. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 523 (explaining justification for proximate cause in felony
murder).
117. Hamrick, 624 P.2d at 1324; see also People v. Rostad, 669 P.2d 126, 128 (Colo. 1983).
118. Hamrick, 624 P.2d at 1323.
119. Auman, 109 P.3d at 662-63.
120. Collier v. State, 261 S.E.2d 364, 372 (Ga. 1979) (overruled on other grounds).
121. See Binder, supra note 113, at 204 (stating that proximate cause requires forseeability);
see also DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 523.
122. 1827 Ill. Laws ch. 124-65.
123. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210 introductory n., at 2 (1962) ("The final innovation of Section
210.2 is its departure from the traditional rule of felony murder. Section 210.2(1)(b) establishes a
[Vol. 83:2
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states still continue to utilize felony murder for prosecution., 24 There are
two primary justifications for the endurance of the felony murder rule.'
25
First, it is meant as a means of deterring accidental deaths during the
commission of felonies. 126 Second, society continues to uphold the doc-
trine because it reaffirms the sanctity of human life. 127 These two policy
reasons for the continuance of felony murder liability are touted for their
justifications, but upon closer examination of the doctrine, felony murder
liability has been expanded beyond any rational reason for its original
invention.
1. Deterrence
The most commonly cited reason underlying the purpose of the fel-
ony murder doctrine is that it acts "to deter felons from killing negli-
gently or accidentally by holding [defendants] strictly responsible for the
killings they commit.' ' 128 If individuals are held liable for any death that
occurs during the commission of a felony, the deterrence theory asserts
that the felon will proceed with the felony in a more careful manner that
will be less likely to result in a death. 129  This reasoning is illogical:
"Quite simply, how does one deter an unintended act?"' 130  The deter-
rence theory is a crude attempt to justify the broadening of the felony
murder doctrine. The felony murder doctrine "does not punish an actor
for the social harm caused by her intentional conduct. Instead, it looks
beyond the intentional conduct to punish the social harm caused by an
unintended, perhaps unforeseeable result - and it does so with the sever-
est possible penalties available under law."' 3 1  Moreover, even though
the statistical data is hard to find and usually unreliable, homicides dur-
ing the commission of felonies are not very common. 132 One source cites
that "only one-half of one percent of all robberies end up in a homi-
presumption that the requisite recklessness and indifference to the value of human life exist when a
homicide is committed during the course of certain enumerated felonies. This presumption has the
effect of abandoning the strict liability aspects of the traditional felony-murder doctrine but at the
same time recognizing the probative significance of the concurrence of homicide and violent fel-
ony.").
124. Guyora Binder, Felony Murder and Mens Rea Default Rules: A Study in Statutory Inter-
pretation, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 399,400-01 (2000) ("It is commonly said that almost every state in
the country has retained some form of the felony murder rule and so repudiated the Model Penal
Code's proposed reform.").
125. DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 516-18.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 133 (Cal. 1965); see also MODEL PENAL CODE §
210.2 cmt. 6, at 37-8 (1962); Gerber, supra note 104, at 779-82; Tomkovicz, supra note 97, at 1448-
58.
129. DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 516.
130. Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at Constitu-
tional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 451 (1985).
131. Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 1, Auman v. People, 109 P.3d 647 (Colo. 2005), available at http://www.nacdl.org
(follow "Amicus Briefs" hyperlink; then follow "Auman v. State" hyperlink).
132. DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 517.
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cide."' 133 This begs the question: what exactly does the felony murder
doctrine deter?
The deterrence theory of felony murder is illogical when viewed in
light of the current structure of the Colorado felony murder statute. If the
felony murder doctrine is used as a means to deter felons from causing a
death, its purpose failed in the Auman case.' 34  In People v. Washing-
ton,' 35 the California Supreme Court stated that "The purpose of the fel-
ony-murder rule is to deter felons from killing negligently or accidentally
by holding them strictly responsible for killings they commit .... This
purpose is not served by punishing them for killings committed by their
victims.' ' 136 Similarly, the purpose of the felony murder doctrine is not
served by punishing a co-participant who voluntarily surrendered before
the killing occurred. If arrest did not prevent Auman from being held
liable for Jaehnig's murderous actions, it is wholly unsound that the ap-
plication of the felony murder doctrine in this case was for deterrence
reasons.' 37 Norm Mueller of the National Association of Criminal De-
fense Lawyers stated that the Colorado Supreme Court's interpretation of
the felony murder statute was "not just a stunningly bad interpretation of
the felony murder law, it's awful public policy.' 38  This type of broad
interpretation, instead of deterring accidental death, could have the oppo-
site effect and place police officers at risk since there will not be an in-
centive to surrender when fleeing from a felony.' 39  This would more
likely deter surrender and not deter homicides. 40  When felony murder
liability is stretched so far that even arrest does not terminate it, the de-
terrence theory of felony murder appears to be a fallacy.
2. Reaffirms Sanctity of Human Life
One of the reasons for the enduring felony murder rule is that the
doctrine "reaffirms the sanctity of human life.' 4 1 The rule reflects soci-
ety's view that the crime of homicide that occurs during a felony de-
serves a harsher punishment than for a felony that does not result in a
death.' 42 However, what makes felony murder distinct from other first-
133. DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 517 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 799-800 nn.23-4
(1982) (reporting the data)).
134. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 516-17; Auman, 109 P.3d at 650.
135. 402 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1965).
136. Washington, 402 P.2d at 133 (citations omitted).
137. See People v. Williams, 406 P.2d 647, 650 (Cal. 1965) (stating that deterrence purpose of
felony murder doctrine was not served when the doctrine was used with a non-inherently dangerous
crime); see also DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 516-17.




141. DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 517-18; State v. La Grand, 734 P.2d 563, 572 (Ariz. 1987)
("The felony murder rule, designed as it is to protect human life, represents sounds public policy, is
reasonably related to the end sought to be accomplished, and is not constitutionally impermissible.").
142. DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 517.
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degree murder is that the death is accidental or negligent.1 43 Since the
death is accidental, the felon should not pay for the crime with the same
degree of punishment as a vicious murderer.44 This use of the rule is not
reasonable, and furthermore, is not in the interests of justice, to punish a
criminal who did not have the mens rea to commit a premeditated murder
with punishments reserved for first-degree murderers. 145 Moreover, an
individual who did not actually pull the trigger on the gun, and who was
physically incapable of committing the murder, or preventing it, should
not be forced to serve the time for another's actions. 146 This in no way
"reaffirms the sanctity of human life.' ' 147 The justification for reaffirm-
ing society's ideal of the sanctity of life is merely a guise for allowing a
punishment that does not fit the crime. 148 Furthermore, when the doc-
trine is stretched to include an individual such as Auman, who has volun-
tarily turned herself over to police custody, the justification no longer is
logical.' 49 The Colorado Supreme Court's interpretation of the doctrine
has expanded the felony murder rule beyond its original premise.
IV. FELONY MURDER ACROSS THE UNITED STATES
A. Other States' Felony Murder Statutes
Throughout the years, each jurisdiction struggled to define and cod-
ify felony murder. In the past century there was a trend, in some juris-
dictions, to limit felony murder, either by scope or by punishment.
50
The first felony murder statute emerged in Illinois in 1827.151 At
this point in time, felony murder was used to only hold liable those per-
sons who engaged in felonies that resulted in a death.' 52  The death,
though unintentional, still needed to be reasonably foreseeable. 53 Since
the codification of this felony murder rule, the doctrine has been ex-





146. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 517 ("Even if a felony that results in a death should be
punished more severely than one that does not result in a homicide, it hardly follows that a felon
who accidentally takes a life should be subject to the severe penalties, including death or life impris-
onment, reserved for murderers."); but see Auman, 109 P.3d at 650 (holding, as a matter of law, that
Auman's arrest did not terminate felony murder liabilty).
147. DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 517-18.
148. See Tomkovicz, supra note 97, at 1457 (describing the justifications for felony murder as
a delusion).
149. See generally id.
150. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 519 ("Many courts have engrafted limitations on the
felony-murder rule .... ); Roth & Sundby, supra note 130, at 446-47.
151. I11. Rev. Code, Crim. Code, 22, 24, 28 (1827).
152. See Binder, supra note 113, at 65 ("Beginning in the 1820s, many American legislatures
passed true felony murder statutes, imposing murder liability for all killings in the attempt of certain
felonies.").
153. Id. at 121 (statutes during this time period used language such as "naturally" and "prob-
able consequences" to include an element of foreseeability).
154. See Auman v. People, 109 P.3d 647, 650 (Colo. 2005); see DRESSLER, supra note 2, at
519.
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For instance, Michigan requires an accomplice to have intent to kill
and therefore, entirely abolished the common law felony murder rule
through case law. 155 Similarly, Hawaii and Kentucky have abolished
their felony murder statutes. 56 Ohio eliminated the felony murder stat-
ute and changed it to involuntary manslaughter.1 57 Minnesota and Wis-
consin have likewise reduced the degree of felony murder and the pun-
ishment that couples it.' 58  Moreover, the state supreme court in New
Mexico determined that there must be a mens rea requirement for felony
murder.' 59 Other states have reduced the punishment that accompanies
felony murder. Alaska, Louisiana, New York, Pennsylvania, and Utah
all have reduced felony murder to second degree murder instead of first
degree murder.' 60  Other states have added an affirmative defense.'61
Furthermore, England, the source of American common law, abolished
its felony murder rule in 1957.162
However, even these attempts to reduce the harshness of the felony
murder doctrine have met criticism because "they do not resolve [the
rule's] essential illogic.' ' 163 Even with legislation reducing the scope and
punishments that accompany felony murder convictions, this rule contin-
ues to be stretched beyond reason. 164
B. Other States'Felony Murder Case Law
Other states have looked at the issue of arrest in the context of fel-
ony murder liability. For instance, a Georgia case deliberately stated that
"[t]he underlying felony can.., terminate for the purpose of the felony-
murder rule if the perpetrator is arrested."'' 65 Likewise, in Coleman v.
155. People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 335 (Mich. 1980) ("Today we simply declare that the
offense popularly known as felony murder, which, properly understood, has nothing to do with
malice and is not a species of common-law murder, shall no longer exist in Michigan, if indeed it
ever did."); see also DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 515.
156. HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-701 (2004) (First-degree murder statute does not include felony
murder); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020 (LexisNexis 2004) (same); see also DRESSLER, supra note
2, at 515 n.110.
157. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01, 2903.04 (LexisNexis 2005).
158. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 315 (Minnesota reduced felony murder to a third degree offense);
WIS. STAT. § 940.03 (2005) (Wisconsin reduced felony murder to class B felony that includes no
more than a twenty year prison sentence).
159. State v. Ortega, 817 P.2d 1196, 1204 (N.M. 1991); see also DRESSLER, supra note 2, at
515 n.l10.
160. See Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 315 (discussing other jurisdictions handling of felony murder
statutes); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.110(a)(3) (2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30. l(A)(2)(a) (2005);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (Consol. 2005); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2502(b) (2005) ("A criminal
homicide constitutes murder of the second degree when it is committed while defendant was en-
gaged as a principal or an accomplice in the perpetration of a felony."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-
202(l)(d) (2005).
161. E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (Consol. 2005).
162. Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, § I (Eng.); see also DRESSLER, supra note 2, at
515.
163. Roth & Sundby, supra note 130, at 447 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 6, at
36(1962)).
164. See, e.g., Auman, 109 P.3d at 650; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1105(A)(2) (Lex-
isNexis 2005).
165. Collier v. State, 261 S.E.2d 364, 372 (Ga. 1979) (overruled on other grounds).
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United States,166 the issue on review was whether there was "such an
'arrest' of the appellant as to break the essential link between the robbery
and the killing."'' 67 If a determination could be made that the arrest did
break the essential link between the felony and the death, arrest would
have terminated the immediate flight stage and cut off felony murder
liability.
168
In People v. Irby,169 a New York court was faced with a question of
whether the temporary police custody of the defendant terminated the
underlying felony.' 70 At the trial court, the jury was not instructed on the
issue of arrest. The New York Court of Appeals determined that Irby
was entitled to have a proper trial where the jury would be instructed on
the significance of her police custody or arrest. 171 The court further de-
termined that it was error for the appellate division to deem the issue of
arrest irrelevant.
172
A California court reversed a defendant's conviction for first-degree
murder when he and a co-participant robbed a store and the owner of the
store shot and killed the co-participant. 173 The court concluded that hold-
ing the defendant liable for his co-participant's death was an absurd use
of the felony murder doctrine. 74  Furthermore, this court likened the
result with that of a robber being held responsible for a co-participant's
actions when he himself was already under arrest and in police custody at
the time the accomplice was killed.
75
The California case is analogous to the situation in the Auman
1 76
Though Auman's accomplice was not the one killed, it parallels the
situation. 77 The California court condemned this exact application of
the felony murder doctrine that Colorado applied in Auman.178  The
Colorado Supreme Court concluded that a co-participant will still be
found responsible for acts committed by other participants, even while in
police custody. This is a legally absurd use of the felony murder doc-
trine.
Yet, in deciding Auman, the court refused to conclude that as a mat-
ter of law arrest should terminate liability.179 The court decided to leave
166. 295 F.2d 555 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
167. Coleman, 295 F.2d at 561.
168. Id. at 560-61.
169. 47 N.Y.2d 894 (N.Y. 1979).
170. Irby, 47 N.Y.2d at 895.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 135 (Cal. 1965).
174. Washington, 402 P.2d at 134.
175. Id.
176. Id.; see also Auman, 109 P.3d at 653.
177. Id.
178. Washington, 402 P.2d at 134.
179. Auman, 109 P.3d at 650.
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the issue to the jury and remanded the case.180  Unfortunately, because
the court dodged the issue at hand, the law in Colorado now stands that
arrest as a matter of law does not terminate the immediate flight stage of
felony murder. 181 In fact, because the court refused to discuss the issue
of terminating immediate flight, the stage of immediate flight in felony
murder could possibly be endless. 82 The court needed to define the limi-
tation and scope of the immediate flight stage of felony murder. 83 Ar-
rest is so significant to an individual's culpability concerning felony
murder that in Colorado arrest should terminate immediate flight in fel-
ony murder as a matter of law.
V. BACKGROUND
The scope of felony murder can, and has, been stretched to cover
those felons who are not even in the course of committing the felony but
are in the flight therefrom. 84 Colorado amended its felony murder stat-
ute in 1971 to include the phrase "immediate flight therefrom."' 85 This
concept has been codified into the current Colorado statute186 and was
derived both from New York's penal law and Colorado cases decided
before the revision of the code. 187 Currently, Colorado has one of the
most stringent felony murder statutes in the United States.'
88
A. Overview of Colorado's Felony Murder Statute
Colorado's felony murder statute has been deemed one of the harsh-
est felony murder statutes in the country.189  In the state of Colorado,
felony murder is classified as first-degree murder, 190 which carries with it
the equally harsh sentence of life imprisonment without parole. "9! In
1971, Colorado's General Assembly modeled the Colorado felony mur-
der statute on New York's penal law. 192  New York added the words
"immediate flight therefrom" to "clarify that felony-murder liability does
not terminate upon the completion of the predicate felony."' 93 The for-
180. Id. at 671.
181. Id. at 650.
182. See generally Erwin S. Barbre, Annotation, What Constitutes Termination of Felony for
Purposes of Felony-Murder Rule, 58 A.L.R. 3D 851 (2004).
183. Id. § 9.
184. Id.
185. Act of June 2, 1971, ch. 121, sec. 1, 1971 Colo. Sess. Laws 388, 418; COLO. REV. STAT. §
40-3-102(l)(b) (1971).
186. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(1)(b) (2005).
187. § 40-3-102(l)(b); see also Auman v. People, 109 P.3d 647, 657-58 (Colo. 2005).
188. § 18-3-102(1)(b).
189. See Auman, 109 P.3d at 650 (ruling in case expanded liability by stating that even arrest
will not automatically terminate immediate flight from felony). For less harsh felony murder stat-
utes, see supra Part IV.
190. § 18-3-102(l)(b).
191. § 18-3-102(3) ("Murder in the first degree is a class 1 felony."); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-
1.3-401(V)(A) (2005) (requiring a minimum sentence of life imprisonment, a maximum sentence of
death coupled with no mandatory period of parole for class I felonies).
192. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(3) (Consol. 2004).
193. Auman, 109 P.3d at 658 (reciting reasons for including "immediate flight therefrom"
language within revision of felony murder statute); COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-3-102(l)(b) (1971).
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mer Colorado felony murder statute did not include the words "immedi-
ate flight therefrom,"'' 94 but the Colorado Supreme Court interpreted this
statute to encompass immediate flight within felony murder liability.' 95
Within Colorado case law, the expansion of felony murder liability en-
compassing immediate flight first began to emerge. 1
96
1. Colorado - Emergence of Immediate Flight in Felony Murder
Liability
Colorado's previous felony murder statute stated that murder com-
mitted in the perpetration or the attempted perpetration of a specific fel-
ony would be considered first-degree murder. 197  The statute did not
specify any limitations on when and where perpetration of a crime termi-
nates. Without a statute that clarified and defined immediate flight from
an underlying felony, Colorado courts were free to set limitations of li-
ability or to expand upon it.198
Before the phrase "immediate flight therefrom" was codified in
Colorado, the Colorado Supreme Court interpreted this phrase to be
within the scope of felony murder liability. For instance, in Bizup v.
People,199 the defendant robbed a taxi-cab driver and shot and killed him
later in the evening.200 The defendant was convicted of first-degree mur-
der, although he contended that the murder occurred after the robbery
had ended. 20 ' The court affirmed his first-degree murder conviction and
held that "[t]he robbery and the killing which followed were all part of
the same transaction. They were so closely connected in point of time,
place, and continuity of action as to be one continuous transaction.,
20 2
The court, in this case, demonstrated how actions committed after the
initial felony could still be considered part of the crime for purposes of
felony murder liability.20 3
Furthermore, in People v. McCrary,2°4 the court affirmed the defen-
dant's felony murder conviction based on the fact that he and the co-
felon were still in the immediate flight from the felony.20 5 The defendant
and the co-felon had robbed a doughnut shop and kidnapped an em-
194. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-3(1) (1963) (amended 1971) (current version at § 18-3-
102(l)(b)).
195. See Bizup v. People, 371 P.2d 786 (Colo. 1962); Auman, 109 P.3d at 657.
196. See Bizup, 317 P.2d at 788; People v. McCrary, 549 P.2d 1320, 1331 (Colo. 1976).
197. § 40-2-3(1) ("All murder... which is committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpe-
trate any arson, rape, robbery, mayhem, or burglary... shall be deemed murder of the first degree..
198. § 40-3-102(l)(b).
199. 371 P.2d 786 (Colo. 1962).
200. Bizup, 371 P.2d at 787.
201. Id. at 788.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. 549 P.2d 1320 (Colo. 1976).
205. McCrary, 549 P.2d at 1332.
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ployee.2 °6 In this case, the felons, after kidnapping their victim, stopped
at a bar for approximately twenty to thirty minutes to have a drink.20 7
They left the bar and eventually stopped again down the road.20 8 The
defendant's co-participant murdered the employee while the defendant
had stepped out of the car.20 9 Even though the felony murder statute in
force at the time did not mention immediate flight as an element of fel-
ony murder, the court interpreted the statute to cover flight from a fel-
ony.21 ° In this case the court concluded that immediate flight had not
terminated even though the felons had left the scene of the crime, entered
a new location and found a place of temporary safety.211 This case dem-
onstrates the court's ability to broaden the scope of felony murder and
the ease with which the court could expand upon liability.212
When these cases were decided, Colorado's previous felony murder
statute was still in effect.2 13 This prior statute did not specifically state
that immediate flight could trigger felony murder liability. 21 4 However,
the court determined that "escape from the scene of the underlying fel-
ony is part of the res gestae of a crime so that a murder committed to
facilitate the flight can be felony murder., 215 The court interpreted the
statute to include immediate flight from the predicate crime because the
actions of the defendant were "one continuous integrated attempt to suc-
cessfilly complete his crime and escape detention., 21 6 The Colorado
General Assembly would later take these decisions and codify them into
what is presently the felony murder statute in Colorado.2t 7
Colorado modeled its felony murder statute after a similar New
York statute.21 8 Prior to 1965, New York's statute only covered a killing
that occurred during the commission of a felony. 219 However, New York
included the phrases "in the furtherance of' and "immediate flight there-
from" in the statute to reinforce the fact that liability does not end when
the underlying crime is completed. 220 After New York added the "im-
mediate flight" language to the statute, Colorado followed suit in 1971.221
The present felony murder statute in Colorado states in part that:




210. Id. at 1331-32.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-3(1) (1963).
214. See McCrary, 549 P.2d at 1331 n.13; § 40-2-3(1).
215. McCrary, 549 P.2d at 1331. Res Gestae is defined as "the events at issue, or other events
contemporaneous with them." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1335 (8th ed. 2004).
216. McCrary, 549 P.2d at 1332 (quoting Bizup, 371 P.2d at 788).
217. COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-102(1)(b) (2005).
218. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25; see also Auman, 109 P.3d at 658.
219. People v. Donovan, 385 N.Y.S.2d 385, 389 (App. Div. 1976).
220. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25; see Auman, 109 P.3d at 658.
221. See supra, note 185.
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A person commits the crime of murder in the first degree if...
[a]cting either alone or with one or more persons, he or she commits
or attempts to commit... burglary... and, in the course of or in fur-
therance of the crime that he or she is committing or attempting to
commit, or of immediate flight therefrom, the death of a person, other
than one of the participants, is caused by anyone.222
Colorado courts have now interpreted this statute to include actions
in furtherance of the immediate flight and have stated that even arrest of
a co-felon does not automatically terminate immediate flight as a matter
of law. 223 The Colorado felony murder rule has now transformed into a
rule that disregards individual intent and foreseeability, ignoring other
states' attack on the doctrine.224
VI. ANALYSIS
Upon granting certiorari, the Colorado Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that the law was unsettled on the issue of immediate flight and
when liability terminates. 225 The court had the opportunity to define the
limitations of immediate flight but did not step up to the task. Instead,
the court expanded liability for felony murder by stating that, as a matter
of law, arrest does not automatically terminate immediate flight when a
co-felon still remains in flight.226
The Auman case sparked a national controversy over the degree of
Lisl Auman's culpability.227 Proponents of the Colorado Supreme
Court's ruling in Auman hold strong that Officer VanderJagt was killed
because Auman set into action the course of events that led to the chase
of an enraged skinhead with a death wish.228 Others believe that the un-
derlying events that Auman was involved in terminated once she was
placed in police custody.
229
The outcome of the Auman case is troubling for defendants and de-
fense counsel alike.23° Critics of the expansion of felony murder liability
hold firm that Colorado should place a well-defined limitation on the
scope of immediate flight.231 The most shocking aspect of the Colorado
Supreme Court's ruling was how far the court was willing to stretch the
222. § 18-3-102(1)(b).
223. Auman, 109 P.3d at 651.
224. See supra Part V.A.
225. Auman v. People, 109 P.3d 647, 655 (Colo. 2005).
226. Auman, 109 P.3d at 651.
227. Fortado, supra note 1, at 6.
228. Id.; Diane Carman, Auman Case Complicated But Crucial, DENVER POST, Jan. 21, 2004,
at BO1.
229. Karen Abbott & Jeff Kass, Auman 's Life Term Argued in High Court; "Harsh Result"
Divisive After Officer's 1997 Slaying, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Jan. 16, 2004, at 6A. Justice Gregory
Hobbs stated that "This is a harsh result ... She gets life imprisonment. She didn't commit the
murder. She's not committing the burglary, and she's no longer in flight at the time this occurred."
Id. (quoting oral arguments in Auman v. People, 109 P.3d 647 (Colo. 2005)).
230. Carman, supra note 228.
231. Reggie Rivers, Felony Murder Law Too Inflexible, DENVER POST, April 1, 2005, at B7.
20051
658 DENVER UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW [Vol. 83:2
boundaries of felony murder liability.232 The ruling on immediate flight
is illogical and could lead to prosecution of participants, like Auman,
who happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time, and who volun-
tarily surrender themselves over to police custody.23 3
Critics of the felony murder doctrine believe that the rule is being
stretched too far under the guise of "deterring" felonies. 23 4  When the
rule is stretched beyond its reasonable limits, legally unsound results will
follow that are out of line with the general purpose of the felony murder
doctrine.235 The felony murder rule "should not be extended beyond any
rational function that it is designed to serve. 23 6 Was holding Auman
liable for the death of Officer VanderJagt a rational function that the fel-
ony murder rule was designed to serve? The amount of attention this
case has gathered demonstrates that the Colorado Supreme Court has
stretched felony murder liability too far.237
A. Broadening the Scope of Felony Murder
Examining the purpose behind felony murder, it becomes clear that
Colorado has lost all sight of the original intent of the rule - namely to
deter accidental and unintentional deaths.238 In addition, felony murder
is based on the notion that there is a reasonably foreseeable possibility
that a death could occur during some element of the underlying felony.
2 39
But when arrest does not cause the chain to be broken in the immediate
flight element, the purpose behind the felony murder doctrine disap-
pears.240 Liability should be cut off when it no longer is foreseeable that
a death might result in an underlying felony. Liability, also, should be
terminated, as a matter of law, upon arrest.
The Auman court dissected Colorado's felony murder statute to jus-
tify the ruling on immediate flight.24' The Colorado felony murder stat-
ute states that a defendant acting "either alone or with one or more per-
sons" is subject to felony murder liability, even during the "immediate
flight therefrom., 242  The court interpreted this language to indicate that
either a sole participant's liability during immediate flight might be ter-
232. Auman, 109 P.3d at 650.
233. See Rivers, supra note 23 1, at B7.
234. See supra Part III.B. I (discussing deterrence theory of felony murder).
235. See People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 134 (Cal. 1965) (discussing absurd results of
felony murder doctrine).
236. Id.
237. See Fortado, supra note 1, at 6; Carman, supra note 228 (quoting Norm Mueller of the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers calling the ruling "dangerous"); Abbott & Kass,
supra note 229; Rivers, supra note 231 ("By mandating a life sentence for anyone convicted of this
crime, the legislature has created the potential for situations like Auman's, where she's not totally
innocent, but her punishment is unjust because it's too severe for her role in the crime.").
238. See supra Part 111.B.1; see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(1)(b) (2005).
239. See supra Part III.A (discussing proximate cause in felony murder).
240. See supra Part III (examining the purposes and justifications of felony murder doctrine).
241. Auman, 109 P.3d at 656-57.
242. § 18-3-102(l)(b).
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minated by arrest, or that all the participants must be in custody for arrest
to terminate the immediate flight stage.243 However, the Colorado Su-
preme Court gave no authority for this reading of the statute. The felony
murder statute does not clarify whether all of the participants, some or
just one of them must be in police custody for immediate flight to termi-
nate. 244 Therefore, it is plausible that there is another logical reading of
the statute. The arrest of only one participant should not preclude a find-
ing that the immediate flight stage has been terminated for that one indi-
vidual.245 The court relied on the fact that the General Assembly did not
specifically write this particular instance into the statute, and therefore,
concluded that the non-existence of any wording to indicate that the ar-
rest of only one participant could terminate the immediate flight stage
was not unintentional.246
The notion that people should be held responsible for the natural
and probable consequences of their acts is at the center of criminal law
jurisprudence.247 In the State of Colorado, felony murder has been ap-
plied and upheld in cases where a killing occurred because of the natural
248and probable consequences of the defendant's actions. Auman is not
one of these cases. There is a fine line to be drawn between "but for"
causation, that the jury used to hold Auman liable, and the point where
liability terminates.249 Using the overly simple "but for" causation test in
all felony murder cases, every slight action of every person involved
could result in numerous people being held liable for first-degree murder.
"But for" causation does not leave room for intervening causes or un-
foreseeable results.25°
The Colorado Supreme Court, in People v. Calvaresi,251 defined the
standard of intervening causes in death cases:
To warrant a conviction for homicide, the death must be the natural
and probable consequence of the unlawful act, and not the result of
an independent intervening cause in which the accused does not par-
ticipate, and which he could not foresee. If it appears that the act of
the accused was not the proximate cause of the death for which he is
243. Auman, 109 P.3d at 656.
244. § 18-3-102(l)(b).
245. See Barbre, supra note 182 (noting that the issue of arrest terminating liability for felony
murder purposes has been raised with varying degrees of success.) Most existing case law on this
topic "can be read as supporting the view that under certain circumstances arrest could terminate the
underlying felony." Id.
246. Auman, 109 P.3d at 656-57 (citing Zamarripa v. Q & T Food Stores, Inc., 929 P.2d 1332,
1339 (Colo. 1997)).
247. See Hamrick v. People, 624 P.2d 1320, 1324 (Colo. 1981).
248. See id,
249. See generally DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 523 ("The but-for causal connection is often
easy to satisfy.").
250. See Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Petitioner, supra note 131, at 15 ("The broad 'but for' theory of felony murder causation
argued by the prosecution in Ms. Auman's case does not increase the deterrence value of the felony
murder rule enough to justify the increased harshness of its results.").
251. 534 P.2d 316 (Colo. 1975).
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being prosecuted, but that another cause intervened, with which he
was in no way connected, and but for which death would not have
occurred, such supervening cause is a defense to the charge of homi-
cide.
252
The Colorado Supreme Court stated that Auman did not qualify for
an instruction on intervening cause since both she and Jaehnig were still
running from the burglary.253 However, the court could have issued an
instruction to the jury regarding arrest being a sufficient intervening
cause.254 The Auman court did conclude that arrest is an issue for the
jury;255 therefore, the Auman case warranted a jury instruction on the
issue of intervening causes since there was an issue of arrest as a super-
vening cause.
The court held that as a matter of law an arrest of a co-felon does
not terminate liability while another participant is still in the immediate
flight stage of the predicate crime.256 This rule may bring about legally
absurd results in the justice system. In most burglaries, there is a rea-
sonably foreseeable possibility that a death could ensue. 7 However, in
the Auman case, it was an unforeseeable result that Jaehnig would kill
the officer once Auman was already placed in police custody. 8 In gen-
eral terms, holding a co-participant liable for the death of an officer after
being taken into police custody and having no further control over the
actions of the co-participant, is a legally unsound result.
B. A Solution: Let the Punishment Fit the Crime
The felony murder doctrine has been slated as an "ancient rule" that
has been "created apart from any constitutional considerations and has
been bombarded by intense criticism and constitutional attack., 259 One
attack on felony murder is that the punishment does not fit the crime in
some circumstances. 6 ° In Auman, the punishment was excessive in rela-
tion to the crime that was committed. She did not actually pull the trig-
ger, but was charged, in essence, as if she had.26' She was sentenced
252. Id. at 319 (quoting 1 F. WHARTON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 200,
at 448 (12th ed. 1957)).
253. Auman, 109 P.3d at 663.
254. See Calvaresi, 534 P.2d at 319.
255. Auman, 109 P.3d at 651.
256. Id. at 650.
257. See generally DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 515 (noting that burglary is an inherently dan-
gerous felony); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2, cmt. 6, at 37 (1962) ("For the vast majority of
cases it is probably true that homicide occurring during the commission or attempted commission of
a felony is murder independent of the felony-murder rule.").
258. Auman, 109 P.3d at 653.
259. State v. Maldonado, 645 A.2d 1165, 1171 (N.J. 1994).
260. See Roth & Sundby supra note 130, at 446; Donald Baier, Note, Arizona Felony Murder:
Let the Punishment Fit the Crime, 36 ARIz. L. REv. 701, 703 (1994) ("[F]elony murder rule, al-
though popular with prosecutors, is under attack from academics and legislators who wish to limit its
harshness in extreme cases.").
261. See supra note 191 (Felony murder is a class I felony and carries with it a minimum
sentence of life in prison with no mandatory period of parole).
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with life imprisonment without parole - a sentence that should be re-
served for those who commit first-degree murder.262
Felony murder "turns on fortuitous events that do not distinguish
the intention or moral culpability of the defendants. 263 One scholar even
declares that "neither state legislatures nor the courts have sought to
bring the felony-murder rule into line with well-accepted criteria of indi-
vidual accountability and proportionate punishment.
' 264
The common punishment for felony murder is either the death pen-
alty (under specific circumstances) or life sentence without parole.265
For a non-triggerman to be punished with a life sentence without parole
is equally excessive and disproportionate when taken in perspective with
the seriousness of the underlying felony.266 If Auman, for instance, had
only been convicted of burglary without felony murder attaching, she
would not have been sentenced to a life sentence without parole.267 She
did not pull the trigger and kill the officer, but she was sentenced with
the punishment as if she did.268
In Enmund v. Florida,269 the United States Supreme Court stated
that "[i]t is fundamental that 'causing harm intentionally must be pun-
ished more severely than causing the same harm unintentionally.'
' 270
This ruling should likewise extend to the excessive punishment of life
without parole in specific cases where the harm was caused unintention-
ally.271 After the Court's holding in Enmund, the Colorado Supreme
Court's holding in Auman seems unjust and excessive.272 The punish
ment should fit the crime.
In Auman, the Colorado Supreme Court ignored the development in
other jurisdictions of limiting felony murder liability.2 73  Other states
have placed well-defined limitations on felony murder, and some have
abolished this theory altogether based on the "widespread trend, both in
the Model Penal Code and in other states, to abolish or narrow a rule
262. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 517 ("it hardly follows that a felon who accidentally takes
a life should be subject to the severe penalties, including death or life imprisonment, reserved for
murderers.").
263. Locket v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 620 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring); see also People v.
Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 328 (Mich. 1980).
264. George P. Fletcher, Reflections on Felony-Murder, 12 Sw. U. L. REV. 413, 418 (1981).
265. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789-90 (1982) (concluding that death penalty for a
non-triggerman charged with felony murder violated Eighth Amendment).
266. See id. at 797.
267. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-202(2) (2005) (naming burglary as a class 3 felony, bringing
with it a minimum of four years and maximum of twelve years imprisonment).
268. Auman, 109 P.3d at 650 (affinming conviction of felony murder).
269. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).




273. See supra Part IV; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2, cmt. 6, at 30 (1962) ("[I]t is the
submission of the Model Code that the felony-murder doctrine should be abandoned as an independ-
ent basis for establishing the criminality of homicide.").
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universally viewed as unprincipled. 274  The Colorado felony murder
statute's definition of "immediate flight" needs to be clarified and have
limitations set.
One suggestion for eliminating the vastly unsound results that could
appear in future cases based on the Auman ruling, is that the statute, in
general, could carry with it a less harsh punishment: one that fits the
crime. In a criminal trial the jurors are not advised of the effect of the
conviction. 275  The jury does not know what the sentencing or penalty
will be. 276 For instance, an average juror would not know that convicting
a defendant of felony murder carries with it a mandatory life sentence
without parole.277 In fact, juror Linda Chin regretted convicting Auman,
and stated that "[w]hat happened to Lisl [Auman] is wrong, absolutely
wrong. This is one of those rare issues that is so clearly unjust that it
leaves no room for doubt or argument., 278  To eliminate future unjust
results, the Colorado statute should be reformed. Other jurisdictions
have both first-degree and second-degree felony murder statutes.279
Colorado only has first-degree requiring a mandatory life sentence if
convicted. 280  There is no steadfast rule mandating that it be first-degree
murder; 281 that determination is left solely to the legislatures and those in
charge of sentencing.282
There are various degrees of mens rea within the crime of homi-
cide. 28 3 This division of culpability is divided by the intent the individual
274. Judge Rudolph J. Gerber, On Dispensing Injustice, 43 ARIz. L. REV. 135, 147 (2001); see
also MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2, cmt. 6, at 30 (1962) ("The effect of the Model Penal Code, there-
fore, is to abandon felony murder as a separate basis for establishing liability for homicide .....
275. One pattern jury instruction states that:
The question of possible punishment of the defendant is of no concern to the jury and
should not, in any sense, enter into or influence your deliberations. The duty of imposing
sentence rests exclusively upon the court. Your function is to weigh the evidence in the
case and to determine whether or not the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,
solely upon the basis of such evidence. Under your oath as jurors, you cannot allow a
consideration of the punishment which may be imposed upon the defendant, if he is con-
victed, to influence your verdict, in any way, or, in any sense, enter into your delibera-
tions.
1 MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS -CRIMINAL § 9.01(Matthew Bender 2005).
276. Id.
277. See supra note 191 (sentencing for class I felonies).
278. Free List! Press Conference and Rally, at 7,
http://www.lisl.con/documents/free lislpress-transcpt.pdf (transcript of Linda Chin's statement, as
read by Kathy Sparks, at a May 14, 2001 rally for List Auman on the steps of the Colorado State
Capitol building).
279. See supra Part IV; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2, cmt. 6, at 41-42 (1962).
280. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(1)(b) (2004); see also supra note 191 (sentencing for class
I felonies).
281. See supra Part IV (noting that each individual jurisdiction can define scope of felony
murder statute).
282. See id.
283. See generally DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 115-42 (stating that mens rea includes inten-
tionally, knowingly, willfully, negligent or reckless); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 210, introduc-
tory n., at 1 (1962) (stating that the Model Penal Code has abandoned the degree structure of crimi-
nal law and instead "classifies all criminal homicides into the three basic categories of murder,
manslaughter, and negligent homicide.").
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had upon committing the crime.284 For example, if one accidentally
causes the death of another in an automobile collision, it is usually
deemed as a reckless act, specifically vehicular homicide.285 However,
for felony murder, there is no actual intent for the homicide, only the
intent for the underlying felony.286 This needs to be taken into considera-
tion in sentencing felony murder defendants.
Jurisdictions across the United States have dealt with felony murder
sentencing in different capacities.287 Following the trend that "[l]esser
culpability yields lesser liability, ' 288 some states have divided felony
murder itself into degrees. 289 For instance, New York has second-degree
felony murder.290  The sentencing for second-degree is not as harsh as
that for first-degree, thereby providing a more reasonable sentence for
those individuals who did not have the requisite culpability to commit
first-degree murder.291  Other jurisdictions have eliminated the felony
murder rule completely. 292 When Hawaii abolished the felony murder
statute, it inserted the following commentary into its statutes:
Even in its limited formulation the felony-murder rule is still objec-
tionable. It is not sound principle to convert an accidental, negligent,
or reckless homicide into murder simply because, without more, the
killing was in furtherance of a criminal objective of some defined
class. Engaging in certain penally-prohibited behavior may, of
course, evidence a recklessness sufficient to establish manslaughter,
or a practical certainty or intent, with respect to causing death, suffi-
cient to establish murder, but such a finding is an independent deter-
mination which must rest on the facts of each case. In recognition of
the trend toward, and the substantial body of criticism supporting, the
abolition of the felony-murder rule, and because of the extremely
questionable results which the rule has worked in other jurisdictions,
the Code has eliminated from our law the felony-murder rule.
2 93
If the Colorado Supreme Court is unwilling to pull the reigns in on
felony murder liability, it is up to the legislature to provide a more rea-
sonable and fitting approach to felony murder.2 94 The felony murder rule
is not being used for its original purpose.295 In Colorado, the addition of
284. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 115-42.
285. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-106 (2005).
286. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 515.
287. See supra Part IV; see also DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 515.
288. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2, cmt. 6, at 36 (1962).
289. See supra Part IV.
290. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (Consol. 2005).
291. See supra Part IV.
292. " See id.
293. People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 314 (Mich 1980) (quoting HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-
701, commentary). Aaron gives an extensive overview of the history of felony murder in England
and the United States in support of Michigan abolishing the felony murder doctrine. Id. at 307-27.
294. See Rivers, supra note 231, at B7 (calling for the legislature to review felony murder
statute and define a level of intent and to define when flight terminates).
295. See supra Part III.
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the affirmative defense was the legislature's attempt to reform the felony
murder doctrine to allow for an accomplice to be excluded from liabil-
ity.2 96 If this is the extent of reform that the legislature is willing to par-
ticipate in, it is up to the courts to bring felony murder into accord with
other jurisdictions and countries around the world.297
CONCLUSION
In Auman v. People,298 the Colorado Supreme Court expanded li-
ability and held that an arrest, as a matter of law, does not terminate li-
ability for purposes of felony murder when a co-felon is still in the im-
mediate flight stage. 299 The court increased liability for felony murder,
ignoring the elements of proximate cause, such as foreseeability and in-
tention, and refused to acknowledge an intervening cause. 300 Results such
as Auman, are illogical and legally unsound when viewed in light of the
history and justifications of the felony murder doctrine. 30 1  The felony
murder rule should not be extended beyond the purpose for which it was
designed to serve.30 2 Holding Auman liable for the death of Officer Van-
derJagt was an illogical extension of the felony murder rule.30 3 Further
abuse of the doctrine can be avoided if the Colorado felony murder stat-
ute is solidified in regards to placing a well-defined limitation on the
immediate flight stage.
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296. See Fletcher, supra note 264, at 420.
297. See id.; see supra Part IV; see also GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 321-
40 (1978) (discussing French, German and Soviet homicide laws).
298. 109 P.3d 647 (Colo. 2005).
299. Auman, 109 P.3d at 650.
300. See supra Part III.A.
301. See supra Part III.B.
302. See id.
303. See generally DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 516-17 (explaining that the deterrence rationale
does not, in fact, deter accidental killings during felonies).
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